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Abstract 
The  paper  focuses  on  the  importance  of  the  assumptions  made  about  market  structure  and  firm 
behaviors in empirical trade policy analysis. It does it with reference to the most recent changes in the 
EU import regime for bananas, namely the Economic Partnership Agreements and the December 
2009 WTO agreement on bananas. The paper’s contribution to the literature on the issues addressed 
is  threefold:  it  develops  two  original  models  which  incorporate  imperfectly  competitive  market 
structures in a spatial modeling framework; it provides an assessment of the degree of market power 
in international banana trade and, finally, it assesses how the analysis of the implications of the most 
recent changes in the EU import regimes for bananas is affected by the assumptions made regarding 
the prevailing market structure. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
International markets of agricultural products are often highly concentrated. There are several 
example of markets – such as cereals, sugar, bananas  or coffee - in which few trading firms (private 
or not) account for a significant share of world trade. While a considerable body of literature has 
addressed the issue of concentration in the food and retailing industries and the consequences of this in 
terms of market power, not many studies have focused on the structure and behavior of multinational 
agricultural trading firms; in fact, empirical studies are very few and rather outdated. However, for 
more  than  twenty  years,  there  has  been  a  growing  consensus  that  the  assumption  of  perfect 
competition  -  in  general  terms  and  in  modeling  agricultural  trade  in  particular  -  may  often  be 
restrictive (McCorriston, 2002).  Yet, empirical agricultural trade policy analysis mostly relies on the 
assumption of perfect competition.  
The aim of this paper is to address the relevance of the assumptions about market structure and 
firm behavior in the empirical analysis of agricultural trade policies. The paper focuses on the most 
recent changes in the EU import regime for bananas, namely the Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) and the December 2009 WTO agreement. This is a good case study to assess to what extent, if 
any, non competitive behaviors matter when evaluating the effects of agricultural trade policies. In 
fact,  the  banana  trading  industry  is  among  the  most  evident  examples  of  high  concentration  in 
international  markets,  with  three  multinational  firms  accounting  for  over  50%  of  world  trade. 
Recently, the EC Commission (EC, 2008) has found that four banana traders have violated EU rules 
on  competition,  and  has  consequently  imposed  fines  on  them.  Although  the  suspicion  that  large 
banana traders behave non competitively is very common, the few empirical studies estimating the 
degree of market power in the banana market are limited in their time and geographical coverage and 
provide contrasting results (Deodhar and Sheldon, 1995 and 1996; Herrmann and Sexton, 2001). The Ancona - 122
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lack of evidence of the exercise of market power by banana traders partly explains the assumption of 
perfect competition in most papers assessing the impact of EU policy changes (e.g. Anania, 2006, 
2008 and 2010a; Guyomard et al, 1999a and 1999b; Kersten, 1995;  Spreen et al, 2004; Vanzetti et al, 
2005);  very  few  papers  have  assumed  oligopolistic  behavior  by  banana traders (McCorriston and 
Sheldon,  1996; McCorriston, 2000; Scoppola, 2008). 
On the other hand, for several decades the EU import regime for bananas has been the cause of 
heated  political  confrontation,  both  domestically  and  internationally  (Anania,  2006;  Josling  and 
Taylor, 2003; Read, 2001). In July 2008 the longest ever meeting in WTO negotiations history failed 
to reach an agreement to conclude the Doha round. In the course of these negotiations eleven Latin 
American countries, the US and the EU reached a tentative provisional agreement to bring to an end 
the long-standing WTO banana dispute. However, the failure of the Doha round meeting left the 
banana dispute unresolved. In December 2009 the same countries signed an agreement along the lines 
of what had been agreed 18 months before.
1 Meanwhile, on 1 January 2008  the EU implemented the 
EPAs (EC, 2007), progressively removing barriers to trade between the EU and regional groupings of 
ACP  countries.  Agricultural  exports  from  ACP  countries  which  have  successfully  concluded  the 
negotiations are now entering the EU market duty- and quota-free. For bananas the EPAs meant the 
removal of the duty-free 775,000 t quota for imports originating from ACP countries. It is expected 
that bananas, sugar and rice are the agricultural commodities that will derive most of the benefits of 
the EPAs for ACP countries.  
The  paper  provides  a  quantitative  assessment,  under  different  assumptions  about  market 
structure, first of the impact of the trade preferences the EU granted ACP countries with the EPAs, and 
then of the erosion of these preferences from the reduction of the MFN import tariff for bananas under 
the December 2009 WTO agreement. The banana market is  possibly the one in which benefits from 
trade  preferences  and  potential  losses  from  preference  erosion  are  the  greatest  (Alexandraki  and 
Lankes, 2006; Law, Piermartini and Richtering, 2009; Yang, 2005) and conflicts between different 
interests are most evident and vocal.  
We use a single commodity, spatial, mathematical programming model which is a modified and 
updated version of the one in Anania (2010a). In addition to perfect competition, the model has been 
modified to allow  for two different market structures: the extreme case of international trading firms 
jointly maximizing their profits by forming a cartel and the intermediate case of traders behaving as 
downstream oligopolists and upstream oligopsonists. The paper is organized as follows: the next 
section presents the model, the calibration procedure used and the outcomes in terms of feasible 
market structures; the third discusses the results while the final section proposes some concluding 
remarks.  
2.  THE MODEL  
The model is a modified and updated version of the one used in Anania (2010a) to allow for 
different non competitive market structures; its updated data base now refers to 2007 (in Anania 
(2010a) the model was constructed with reference to 2005), and the shifting over time of supply 
                                                           
1 The agreement called for a reduction of the EU MFN tariff on bananas from 176 to 114 €/t between January 1 2010 and 2017, with a 28 €/t 
tariff cut in the first year. In March and June 2010 the EU reached trade agreements with Colombia, Peru and six Central American countries 
which include relevant provisions on bananas (Anania, 2010b). However, these agreements have not yet been implemented, pending 
ratification by relevant bodies in all countries involved. Ancona - 122
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functions  as  a  result  of  technical changes  has  been modified to  take  into  account, in  addition to 
expected  changes  in  yields,  the  effects  on  land  allocated  for  banana  production.  It  is  a  single 
commodity, spatial, partial equilibrium, mathematical programming model; an objective function is 
maximized subject to a set of constraints describing relevant demand and supply functions, price 
linkages (due, for example, to transportation costs and policy interventions) and policies which cannot 
be represented through exogenously determined price wedges (such as import quotas).
2 Compared to 
general equilibrium models, partial equilibrium models allow for a better representation of complex 
policy instruments, a more detailed representation of markets and require less restrictive assumptions. 
The choice to use a ”spatial”  model - i.e., a model which generates trade flows between each pair of 
countries - is motivated by the fact that this is particularly effective in representing policies where 
different regimes apply to imports from different countries, without having to impose questionable 
assumptions,  such  as  imperfect  substitution  between  bananas  produced  in  different  countries 
(Armington, 1969).
3 Current and recent previous EU trade regimes for bananas considered in this 
paper include preferential tariffs and tariff rate import quotas (TRQs) applied on imports from specific 
groups of countries. 
The model assumes bananas are a homogeneous product; this means that the effectiveness of 
branding in differentiating bananas is ruled out,
4 “fair trade” and organic bananas, which account for a 
fairly small but significant and growing portion of the market, are ignored and consumers are assumed 
to be unable to differentiate bananas on the basis of their country of origin. The model includes five 
sources  of  domestic  supply  within  the  EU,
5  fourteen  exporting  countries,
6  and  four  importing 
countries/regions.
7 Import demand and export supply functions, as well as domestic supply functions 
in the EU, are assumed to be linear, or to be well approximated by linear functions in the relevant 
portions for the simulations conducted.  
Production  functions  in  the  EU  and  import  demand  and  export  supply  functions  in  other 
countries/regions  in  the  base  year  are  obtained  from  observed  produced,  imported  and  exported 
quantities,  observed production, import  and  export prices,  and  supply,    export  supply  and  import 
demand  price  elasticities  at  the  equilibrium  in  each  country/region  (table  1).  The  values  of  the 
elasticities used are exogenous to the model and are based on those used elsewhere (Anania, 2010a; 
Arias et al., 2005; Guyomard, Laroche and Le Mouël, 1999a and 1999b; Kersten, 1995; Spreen et al., 
2004; and Vanzetti et al., 2005) (table 1). Net imports, net exports and average import and export unit 
values  have  been  computed  on  the  basis  of  information  from  the  COMTRADE  and  FAOSTAT 
databases. Data for Martinique and Guadalupe, Canary Islands, Madeira and Azores, and Crete are 
based on information from the European Commission.  
The modelling of the EU-27 import regime in 2007 includes:  
                                                           
2 The basic structure of the model’s constraints is provided in Anania (2010a). 
3 A discussion of advantages and disadvantages of different types of trade models is provided in Anania (2001), Bouët (2008), Francois and 
Reinert (1997), and van Tongeren, van Meijl and Surry (2001). 
4 Some evidence exists that Chiquita is able to exert a price premium (EC, 2008) due to its branding efforts as well as the somewhat higher 
quality of its bananas.  
5  Cyprus, France (Martinique and Guadeloupe), Greece (Crete), Portugal (Madeira and Azores) and Spain (Canary Islands). Banana 
production in continental Portugal is negligible and has been ignored. 
6 Five ACP countries/regions: Belize and Suriname, Cameroon, Dominican Republic, Ivory Coast, and the aggregate of other non-LDC ACP 
net exporters; eight MFN countries/regions: Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama and the aggregate of 
other non-LDC MFN net exporters; and LDC net exporters. 
7 EU15, EU12, United States, and the aggregate of Rest of the world net importers. Ancona - 122
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(a)  for bananas originating in MFN countries, the “tariff only” import regime introduced in 2006 
(the import tariff equals 176 €/t); 
(b) for bananas originating in ACP countries, a 775,000 t TRQ, with duty-free in-quota imports and 
out-of-quota imports subject to the MFN tariff (176 €/t);  
(c)  for bananas originating in LDCs, unlimited duty-free imports.  
For the US and the “Rest of the world net importers” the model includes the tariffs applied in 
2007 (0.5 and 22.2%, respectively). 
The 2006 reform of the EU domestic policy regime for bananas “decoupled” support for banana 
producers  outside  the  “outermost  regions”  of  the  EU  moving  it  into  the  “single  farm  payment” 
introduced with the 2003 Fischler reform of the EU Common Agricultural Policy; this means that 
banana production in Greece, Cyprus and continental Portugal is driven by market forces only, while 
in the “outermost regions” (France; Spain; Azores and Madeira in Portugal) different regimes apply.
8  
In order to assess how the simulation of the effects of policy changes are affected when the 
assumption that markets are perfectly competitive is relaxed, we consider two other  market structures: 
(a) the extreme case of international trading firms jointly maximizing their profits by forming a cartel 
exerting monopsony power in their relations with exporters and monopoly power with respect to 
importers (exporters and importers are assumed to have no market power); and (b) the intermediate 
case of traders behaving as downstream oligopolists and upstream oligopsonists, considering different 
degrees of imperfect competition. 
In the 2007 base model the reference scenario with perfectly competitive markets is modeled by 
maximizing a standard “quasi-welfare” function (Samuelson, 1952;Takayama and Judge, 1971): 
                            q
d
j                                  q
s
i 
      Max W (xin , xqie , xmfnie )    =   ∑j   ∫ p
d
j(m) dm    -  ∑i  ∫ p
s
i(r) dr    -              (1) 
                                                                        0                   0 
                               -  ∑i ∑j (TCij xij) - ∑i ∑e (xmfnie TMFNie ) - ∑i ∑n (xin Tin )  ,              
subject to a set of constraints, where: i is an index for exporting countries and for sources of 
domestic supply in the EU; j is an index for importing countries; e is an index for EU15 and EU12; n 
is an index for non-EU importing countries; p
d
j (m) is country j’s inverse import demand function; p
s
i 
(r) is country i’s inverse export supply function; q
d
j are country j’s total imports; q
s
i are country i’s total 
exports; Tin is the per unit import tariff imposed by country n on its imports from country i ; TCij is the 
per unit international transaction cost for shipments from country i to country j (border to border); 
TMFNie is the MFN import tariff imposed by EU member states e on their imports from country i (it 
applies to imports from MFN importers and on out-of-quota imports from ACP countries); xij is the 
                                                           
8 In France banana producers are entitled to receive a direct payment which has been calculated for each farm on the base of the support 
received by that farm in the past. In order to receive their full entitlements of the direct payments, farms have to produce at least 80% of  
what they produced, on average, in a reference period; if production is between 70% and 80% of what it was in the reference period, the farm 
will receive 80% of the entitled direct payment; if it is below 70% it will receive the same percentage of the entitlement. However, the 
financial incentive is large enough (around 11 600  €/ha) to ensure that farms find it profitable to produce the minimum volume of bananas 
needed for them to claim the full amount of the payments. A similar support mechanism applies in Spain where, in order to receive their full 
entitlement of support payments, farms have to produce at least 70% of  what they produced, on average, in the reference period. In this case 
too the financial incentive (around 11 800  €/ha) is large enough for farms to find it profitable to produce the minimum volume of bananas 
which makes them able to claim their full entitlement of direct payments. In Portugal a fully “coupled” fixed production subsidy is in place. 
The amount of the per unit subsidy in the model is 455.2 €/t.8 The subsidy expenditure cannot exceed Portugal’s financial allocation (€8.7 
million); if production is such that expenditure would exceed the maximum allowed, then the per unit subsidy is cut pro rata so that the 
expenditure equals the budget allocation. 
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trade flow from country i to country j;  xmfnie is the trade flow from country i to EU member states e 
subject to the MFN import tariff. 
The first non-competitive behavior considered is a cartel, that is, the presence of a number of 
competing firms which maximize joint profits; this stylizes the EC Commission’s (2008) detection of 
the existence of a stable cartel among banana traders in Northern European Union countries. We 
assume that colluding traders are able to exert market power upstream as well as downstream; thus, 
the cartel is assumed to exert monopsony power with respect to banana exporters and monopoly power 
with respect to importers. This market structure is modeled by maximizing traders’ total profits, given 
by  total  revenues  across  all  importing  countries  minus  international  transaction  costs,  banana 
acquisition costs and tariff expenditure: 
Max Π (xin , xqie , xmfnie ) = ∑i ∑j ( p
d
j  - p
s
i - TCij ) xij – ∑i ∑e (xmfnie TMFNie )  
                   - ∑i ∑n (xin Tin )  .
 9                     (2) 
In between perfect competition and the cartel, a range of possible non-competitive behaviors are 
introduced in the model by considering different mark-up values . The mark-up is defined as: 





=                                                                       (3)      
 where p is the price and c is the marginal cost.  We model firm oligopolistic/oligopsonist 
behaviors by considering different percentages of mark-up (3%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20% and 25%). This 
third market structure is modeled by maximizing a “quasi-welfare” function (Takayama and Judge, 
1971) modified to include trading firm profits calculated using the mark-up:    
                               q
d
j                            q
s
i 
            Max W (xin , xqie , xmfnie )    =   ∑j   ∫ p
d
j(m) dm    -  ∑i  ∫ p
s
i(r) dr    -              (5) 
                                                                         0                    0 
                       -  ∑i ∑j (TCij xij) - ∑i ∑e (xmfnie TMFNie ) - ∑i ∑n (xin Tin )  - ∑i ∑j (MUij xij) ,  
where  MUij  is the per unit profit on shipments from exporter i to importer j obtained by 
applying the (exogenously determined) percentage of mark-up to total per unit costs, specific to that 
trade flow, incurred by the trader (acquisition price + international transaction cost + paid import tariff 
paid).  
Spatial models which include imperfectly competitive market structures and assume, as we do, a 
perfectly homogeneous product have been proposed by Takayama and Judge (1971), Kawaguchi, 
Suzuki and Kaiser (1997) and Yang, Hwang and Sohng (2002). We believe our model differs from 
theirs in several ways. Takayama and Judge (1971, chapter 11) extend their standard model to include 
a profit maximizing monopolist handling production and trade across all regions. In the cartel case our 
model modifies this framework separating producers from traders (which in our framework are pure 
middlemen) and assuming the cartel of traders to hold monopolistic as well as monopsonistic power, 
                                                           
9 Takayama and Judge (1971, chapter 11) discuss the potential problem of arbitraging in spatial models with imperfect competition. While 
procedures exist to address the problem (Anania and McCalla, 1991), in the model proposed in this paper this does not emerge because 
regions are modeled either as exporters or as importers (they cannot export and import at the same time).  Ancona - 122
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while exporters (and importers) do not have market power. Kawaguchi, Suzuki and Kaiser (1997) 
analyze interregional exchanges of milk in Japan assuming that regional marketing boards maximize 
producers sale revenues net of transportation costs and only one agent handles milk produced in each 
of  the  regions.  They  propose  a  modified  Takayama  and  Judge  model  which  explicitly  includes 
conjectural variation parameters; however, in their modeling of interregional milk trade in Japan they 
assume these parameters to equal zero, i.e. Cournot competition to occur (with all firms exerting 
market power or a subset). In our model market power is exerted by traders rather than each country’s 
producers, imperfect competition is represented through the percentage of mark-up and simulate a 
range of imperfect competition market structures less extreme than Cournot. The adoption of different 
percentages of mark-up to represent the market structure allows us to avoid having to identify each 
firm’s conjectural variation parameters for each importing country, making explicit assumptions about 
the number and symmetry of firms. Yang, Hwang and Sohng (2002) propose a linear complementarity 
programming  formulation  of  the  classical  Takayama  and  Judge  spatial  model  for  a  market 
characterized by heterogeneous downward sloping demand and upward sloping supply functions (like 
the one assumed here), while they suggest the standard Takayama and Judge (1971) spatial modeling 
framework when a common demand function and constant marginal cost are considered. They assume 
Cournot  competition,  whereas  we  prefer  to  consider  other,  less  extreme,  assumptions  on  firm 
behaviors  and  find  no  reason  for  avoiding  using  a  modified  Takayama  and  Judge  modeling 
framework. 
One characteristic of mathematical programming spatial models is that predicted bilateral trade 
flows show an overspecialization with respect to those observed, i.e. the solution includes a smaller 
number  of  non-zero  trade  flows than those  observed.  This  occurs  as  a  result  of  the  optimization 
procedure used as well as the inability of the constraints included in the model to fully represent the 
complexity of the market under scrutiny, because of both the poor quality of available information, 
and the simplified representation in the model of market agent behaviors. In models like the one 
developed in this paper the information which appears weaker is the matrix of bilateral international 
transaction costs. In our model these have been generated from available industry information on 
international transaction costs for few specific bilateral trade flows, using distances between countries 
to  explain  differences  in  the  variable  component  of  transaction  costs.  The  two  step  calibration 
procedure proposed by Paris, Drogué and Anania (2009) has been used to make up for the poor quality 
assumed  of  per  unit  transaction  costs  and  improve  the  capacity  of  the  base  model  to  reproduce 
observed net trade positions as well as bilateral trade flows. Essentially, information regarding the 
observed market equilibrium is used to infer the errors in international transaction costs which, once 
corrected, the model perfectly calibrates the observed country net trade positions.
10 In the first step the 
model is augmented by a set of constraints imposing predicted bilateral trade flows to equal observed 
ones.
11 The values of the dual variables associated in the solution to these constraints are then used in 
                                                           
10 The calibration procedure implicitly assumes that the only potentially ill-measured information in the model is bilateral international 
transaction costs. 
11 Net trade positions and the matrices of trade flows obtained from the Comtrade data base are inconsistent. This is so for several, well 
known, reasons, including the fact that information obtained using the exporters as reporters differ from the same information obtained using 
as reporters the importers (because of inconsistencies in the timing of the declarations by the exporting and the importing countries, as well 
as reporting errors), and that net trade positions are given for each country by the difference between its exports and imports, while trade 
flow matrices consider all trade. In order to calibrate the model consistent net trade positions and trade flows are needed (i.e. net trade 
positions have to equal the marginal distributions of the trade flows matrix); thus a two step reconciliation procedure has been used. In the 
first step net trade positions have been adjusted in order to make total net exports across all countries equal total net imports (for each 
country the original data collected was from its own reporting, which makes the sum of net imports differ from the sum of net exports); Ancona - 122
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step two to correct per unit international transaction costs. The solution of the model in step two 
perfectly replicates observed country net trade positions; in general there are multiple optimal sets of 
bilateral trade flows associated to observed net trade positions, observed trade flows being one of these 
sets (Paris, Drogué and Anania, 2009).  
To explain how the calibration procedure works in the modeling of the three market structures 
considered in the paper we shall make use of a few figures. In figure 1 a two country, perfectly 
competitive market is represented, with no policy intervention; EDj and ESi are the importer’s import 
demand  function  and  the  exporter’s  export  supply  function,  respectively,  and  tcij  is  the  per  unit 
international  transaction  cost,  assumed  not to change  with the  quantity  traded.  Point  A  gives  the 
market equilibrium as generated by the model if no calibration procedure is considered (the solution is 
such that the quantity traded makes the import price equal to the export price augmented by the per 
unit transaction cost); the solution generated by the model differs from observed traded quantity, 
import and export prices
12. The calibration procedure enables the model to reproduce the observed 
market equilibrium by correcting the per unit transaction cost (figure 2); in this case by increasing it 
by an amount equal to  l*ij.
13 Figures 3 and 4 are analogous to figures 1 and 2 for the imperfectly 
competitive  market  where  a  mark-up  is  applied  (observed  traded  quantity  and  prices  in  the  two 
countries, as well as the per unit transaction cost are kept unchanged). In figure 3 ES*i is the mark-up 
inclusive export supply by the traders; in this case the uncalibrated equilibrium generated by the model 
would be that in point B. Figure 4 shows what happens when the calibration procedure is applied. In 
this case the adjustment of the per unit transaction cost,  l*ij , by correcting the per unit transaction 
cost, modifies as well the mark-up inclusive export supply by the traders (which becomes ES**I ); this 
happens because the transaction cost is part of the cost to which the percentage mark-up is applied to 
obtain the traders’ profit per unit of bananas traded. In figure 5 point C represents the equilibrium 
quantity when traders form a cartel and act as a monopolist/monopsonist on the world market and the 
model  is  not  calibrated.  MR  and  MC  represent  the  traders’  marginal  revenue  and  marginal  cost 
functions, respectively ( observed traded quantity and prices and the per unit transaction cost  are the 
same as in the two other market structures represented in figures 1 to 4). In this case the market 
equilibrium obtained by solving the model with no calibration shows a quantity traded which is below 
the  observed  one,  suggesting  the  need  to  calibrate  the  model  by  correcting  the  transaction  cost 
downward,  rather  than  upward  as  in  the  previous  two  cases.  However,  even  setting  the  per  unit 
transaction  cost  equal  zero  is  not  sufficient  to  make  the  model  generate  the  observed  market 
equilibrium (figure 6). An adjustment of transaction costs which makes them negative is needed for 
the model to reproduce the observed market equilibrium (figure 7); this would mean traders receiving 
for each unit of bananas traded a “subsidy” which exceeds transaction cost. 
This is exactly what happens when our model assuming a cartel maximizing joint profits is 
calibrated. This means that the hypothesis of traders colluding by forming a cartel that acts as a 
monopolist and a monopsonist in the world market for bananas turns out to be an unfeasible market 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
reconciliation has been obtained by keeping all net trade positions but one unchanged, and adjusting only that of the aggregate “Rest of the 
world net importers” (table 1). In the second step a minimum least square procedure has been used to obtain trade flows consistent with net 
trade positions and as close as possible to those obtained by using importers as reporters (these declarations are generally believed to be more 
accurate than those by exporters). In the least square procedure (a) observed trade flows (different from EU domestic ones) smaller than 
15,000 t have been set at zero and (b) in the solution trade flows have been constrained to equal zero if observed ones were equal zero.  
12 Observed traded quantity, import and export prices lie on the excess demand and supply functions because of the way these have been 
obtained. 
13 In general, in this as well as in the other cases discussed below, the correction of the transaction cost needed to calibrate the model can 
either be positive or negative. Ancona - 122
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structure,  because  inconsistent  with  observed  quantities  traded  and  importer  and  exporter  border 
prices. The adjustments needed for the model to reproduce observed net trade positions and import and 
export prices are of an order of magnitude which rules out any possibility of this result being driven by 
measurement  errors  of  import  and  export  prices,  including  those  resulting  from  observed  prices 
possibly being intra-firm transfer prices, rather than prices resulting from market transactions between 
different firms. In fact, downward adjustments of transaction costs needed to calibrate the model range 
between 754 and 2,710 US$/t and resulting corrected transaction costs between -553 and -2,600 US$/t.  
This result may not come as a surprise, given that a world cartel, even for the banana market, is 
a rather extreme representation of the world market structure. However, the findings for the other 
imperfectly competitive market structures are less obvious. Indeed, a similar outcome also emerges for 
imperfectly competitive world market structures with a mark-up above 10%. When, for example, a 
20% mark-up is considered, five of the corrected per unit transaction costs became negative, with the 
largest one being equal to -50 US$/t; when a mark-up equal to 15% was modeled, the calibration 
generated two negative corrected transaction costs, the largest one being equal to - 33 US$/t. Even 
when the mark-up was set equal to 10% calibrating the model made two corrected transaction costs be 
negative;  however,  in  this  case  their  values  were  judged  to  be  within  the  range  of  possible 
measurement errors in border prices (the largest one in absolute value was - 13 US$/t). We conclude 
that market structures with international traders acting as non-cooperative oligopolists/oligopsonists 
with a resulting mark-up exceeding 10% are unfeasible in the banana market, because they are largely 
inconsistent with observed border prices.  
These results crucially depend on the assumptions made regarding the imperfectly competitive 
structures of the banana market. For example, we assume that only international traders are in the 
position to exert market power. If this assumption is relaxed and it is assumed instead that actors 
operating downstream (such as retailers) also hold market power, the results obtained may no longer 
hold true.  
3.   RESULTS  
  All the simulations have been generated with reference to 2017, the earliest time horizon for 
the  completion  of  the  implementation  of  the  December  2009  WTO  agreement,  assuming  that  an 
agreement on the modalities in agriculture in the DDA round is reached by the end of 2013.  
The  “2017  base”  reference  model  has  been  obtained  from  the  “2007  base”  by  modelling 
changes in production, import demand and export supply functions in all countries/regions as a result 
of  expected  shifts  in  domestic  demand  and  supply  functions.  Import  demand  and  export  supply 
functions shift according to expected changes, ceteris paribus, in quantities produced and consumed in 
each country/region.
14 Consumption is assumed to vary over time on the basis of observed changes in 
population and per capita incomes (in constant terms) between 1997 and 2007, and 1995-97 and 2005-
07, respectively;
15 the values used for domestic demand income elasticities are provided in table 1. 
                                                           
14  The FAOSTAT data base is the source used for production in 2007. Information on banana consumption in 2007 for all countries does 
not exist; the FAOSTAT data base has been used to calculate apparent consumption (domestic production + imports – exports).  
15 For country aggregates these are both weighted averages obtained using the shares of population in 2007 as weights. The data source is 
the World Development Indicators, by the World Bank. Negative percent changes have been set equal zero; percent changes larger than 5 
have been set equal to 5.  Ancona - 122
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Banana production in each country/region is assumed to change over time, ceteris paribus, in line with 
observed changes in production due to technical changes between 1995-1997 and 2005-2007.
16  
The results of the simulations are presented in tables 2 and 3.  
Four  different  market  structures  have  been  considered,  those  found  to  be  feasible  given 
observed traded quantities and prices: perfect competition and oligopoly/oligopsony with mark-up 
percentages equal to 3%, 5% and 10%. The results for the “2007 base” scenario are the same for all of 
them, each of the four models being calibrated to reproduce the observed market equilibrium.  
Two policy scenarios in 2017 have been simulated in addition to the “base” reference one: a 
scenario in which only the EPAs are introduced, i.e. the EU removes its 775,000 t duty-free import 
quota on bananas originating in ACP countries and these may enter the EU duty-free and without 
being  subject  to  any  quantitative  restriction,  and  a  scenario  in  which,  in  addition  to  EPAs,  the 
December 2009 WTO agreement is implemented, i.e. the MFN tariff imposed by the EU drops from 
176€/t to 114€/t (import tariffs imposed by other countries remain unchanged).  
It may be useful to underline at the outset that the results under the four market structures 
should not be compared directly, as the models which generate them differ, not only in the assumption 
made regarding the market structure, but in other crucial parameters as well. In particular they differ in 
the per unit transaction costs, because of the differences in the results of the calibration procedure for 
the four models; in fact, corrected transaction costs - tcij + l*ij  in figures 2 and 4 - become smaller and 
smaller as we move from perfect competition to increasing degrees of market power.
17 
The simulation results obtained under the four market structures appear fairly close (table 2). 
This comes as no surprise, given the relatively low degrees of market power which have been found to 
be feasible considered in the analysis. Nevertheless, some remarkable differences among the results 
obtained under the various market structures emerge when percentage changes are considered (table 
3). 
Under all market structures the implementation of the EPAs is expected to generate consistent 
benefits for ACP countries, whose total exports increase by more than 80% and export revenue almost 
triples, while MFN and LDC exports and export prices decline and imports by countries different from 
the EU increase; significant trade diversion occurs, with ACP exports previously directed to non-EU 
countries now being redirected toward the latter, and a consistent share of exports by MFN countries 
being diverted in the opposite direction. The most significant differences between the results obtained 
under the four market structures relate to LDC exports. Under perfect competition they export only to 
the EU both in the 2017 base scenario and in the scenario with the EPAs only, and their exports 
decline by 6.9%; when the imperfectly competitive market structures are assumed, they do not export 
to the EU in the 2017 base scenario, but find it profitable to do so when the EPAs are implemented, 
with their exports declining by around 3.5%, less than forecast under the perfect competition scenario. 
                                                           
16  The annual rate of growth for production as a result of technical change is given by the annual rate of change in yields plus 1/3 of the 
annual rate of change in banana harvested area. For country aggregates these are weighted averages obtained using the shares of production 
in 2007 as weights. The data source is the FAOSTAT database. Negative rates have been set equal zero; rates larger than 5 have been set 
equal to 5. In Anania (2010a) only the annual rate of change in yields was considered. The dollar/euro exchange rate in 2017 has been 
assumed to be 1.4 (in the 2007 base model it was 1.371). 
17 This means that differences between simulation results referring to, for example, the perfect competition and the 5% mark-up scenario, 
cannot be interpreted as “the predicted change if the market structure were an oligopoly/oligopsony represented through a 5% mark-up 
instead of a perfectly competitive one”, because it provides  “the predicted change if the market structure were an oligopoly/oligopsony 
represented through a 5% mark-up instead of a perfectly competitive one and transaction costs were lower”. In fact, while results presented 
in Table 3 show, for example, volumes of EU imports under the “EPA + December 2009 agreement” which increase with firms’ market 
power, the contrary would emerge if the models were run using the same per unit transaction costs. Ancona - 122
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What happens is that the profitability of LDC exports to the EU and the Rest of the world markets is 
very close and the reduction of the import price in the latter (because of the outward shift in the export 
supply towards them by MFN countries) makes exporting to the former more profitable, although 
LDCs are able to export less. Firms’ profits increase by 15%; in fact, increased ACP exports and 
export prices overcome the opposite effect on firms’ profits of lower MFN and LDC exports and lower 
export prices and of the elimination of the out-of-quota tariff payments.  
What is interesting is that the increases in the degree of market power make the sign of the 
expected change for some crucial variables switch. This is the case for the EU import price, and, as a 
consequence, for EU consumption and imports. This suggests that if it was found feasible for firms to 
exert higher degrees of market power than those considered here, differences in the results obtained 
were to be much larger in absolute terms than those presented in table 2.  
This leads us to conclude that as the degree of market power increases,  market structure matters 
not only in terms of the expected magnitude of the impact on the different agents involved, but in 
terms of its sign as well. 
When the implementation of the December 2009 WTO agreement is simulated (in addition to 
the EPAs), the effects of the preference erosion for ACP exports are marked and are of the same order 
of magnitude under all market structures. ACP banana exports, which all remain directed to the EU, 
decline by 15%, while MFN exports increase by 3.5% (those directed to the EU expand by 74%, as 
trade diversion occurs in addition to trade creation). The increase in import prices in non-EU markets 
and the decline of EU import price cause LDC exports to be redirected from the EU to the Rest of the 
world; thanks to the lower transaction costs to this destination compared to the EU, they increase by 
1%. In this case firms’ profits decline, although by 2% only, because the negative effects on per unit 
profits of the lower MFN tariff imposed by the EU and the lower imports by the US and the Rest of 
the world are only partially compensated by those, of the opposite sign, of the larger volume of EU 
imports and higher export prices in MFN countries. While the EPAs produced little changes in the EU 
domestic market, the WTO agreement causes the EU domestic price to decline by 10%, consumption 
to increase by 5% and imports to increase by a little more than 15%; on the contrary, EU production 
changes very little, as EU domestic policy for bananas, as explained above, makes only production in 
Greece, Portugal and Cyprus (which jointly account for a very small share of EU banana production) 
react to market signals. The magnitude of changes in market equilibrium increases with firms’ market 
power. 
The overall impact of the EPAs and the WTO agreement with respect to the “2017 base”, which 
is reported in the four columns at the right end of table 3, shows that  the reduction of the preferential 
margin due to the WTO agreement does not cancel out the benefits accrued by ACP countries with the 
EPAs:  when  the  WTO  agreement  is  implemented  their  exports  and  export  revenues  remain 
significantly above those in the base scenario (by more than 50 and 110%, respectively). Analogously, 
despite the trade creation effect of the reduction from 176 to 114 €/t of their relevant tariff , MFN 
countries are not able to fully recover from the loss of competitiveness vis a vis ACP countries which 
results from the EPAs and their exports and export revenue remain slightly below those in the base 
scenario (by around 2% and 3%, respectively).  Ancona - 122
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4.  CONCLUSIONS  
The goal of this paper was to address the importance of the assumptions made about market 
structure and firm behaviors in empirical trade policy analysis with respect to recent changes in the EU 
import regime for bananas. We believe the paper’s contribution to unfolding this issue is threefold: it 
develops two original models which incorporate imperfectly competitive market structures in a spatial 
modeling framework; it provides an assessment of the degree of market power in international banana 
trade and finally it assesses how the effects of the most recent EU import regimes for bananas are 
affected by the assumptions made regarding the prevailing market structure.       
The paper develops two modified versions of the Takayama and Judge (1971) spatial trade 
model.  The first model includes a profit maximizing cartel of the firms which handle international 
trade.  The  second  model  incorporates  oligopolistic  and  oligopsonistic  behaviors  of  trading  firms 
through a mark-up; this modeling framework has the advantage of being flexible, easy to implement 
and does not require identification of  each firm’s conjectural variation parameters, which would 
imply making explicit assumptions about the number and symmetry of the relevant firms in each 
importing market.  
The two step calibration procedure used to make the model replicate observed country net trade 
positions allowed for insights on a relevant issue, that is what is the degree of market power in the 
world market for bananas. Indeed, the result of the analysis presented in the paper is that some market 
structures turn out to be unfeasible, being largely inconsistent with observed quantities and border 
prices. This happens when a cartel maximizing firms’ joint profits is assumed, but also for imperfectly 
competitive world market structures where the  mark-up is above 10%.    
Simulation results confirm those obtained in Anania (2010a). The implementation of the EPAs 
is expected to increase significantly ACP exports to the EU and generate overall consistent benefits for 
ACP countries; significant trade diversion also occurs, with ACP exports previously directed to non-
EU countries now being redirected toward the latter. The 2009 WTO agreement significantly reduces 
the preferential margin for ACP countries, but does not offset the benefits from the EPAs; as a whole, 
with both the EPAs and the WTO agreement in place, ACP countries are better off in terms of both 
exports and export revenues. Analogously, despite the trade creation effect of the lower tariff they face 
on the EU market, the WTO agreement is does not make MFN countries make up from the loss of 
competitiveness vis a vis ACP countries as a result of the EPAs.  
Given the relative low level of market power, simulation results are quite similar across the four 
market  structures  considered.  However, results show  that  as the feasible  degree of  market  power 
increases, market structure matters not only in terms of the expected magnitude of the impact on the 
different agents involved, but in terms of its sign as well.  
The findings of this paper, and especially those concerning the degree of market power in the 
world market for bananas,  depend upon a number of assumptions, common to most empirical studies 
on bananas, the most important of which are, in our opinion that: bananas are a homogeneous product; 
banana traders do not extend their activities downstream, into importing and ripening, or upstream, 
into producing and exporting bananas; actors different from the firms operating in international trading 
(importers and, even more important, retailers) have no market power; the policy changes considered 
have no effect on firm behaviors and market structure.  The removal of any of the above is likely to Ancona - 122
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skew the results reached in this paper; however, it would imply the use of a completely different 
modeling framework and data needs which would be difficult to satisfy.    
Having said that, we believe that, notwithstanding its limitations, this paper does provide useful 
insights for the empirical analysis of trade policy effects in imperfectly competitive markets. 
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Table 1 - Base model input data (2007).
Country/Region
Net Imports




































EU-15 5055,1 844,7 -0,50 0,5 0,49 1,95
EU-12 249,1 810,8 -0,75 0,5 -0,25 4,23
USA 3544,3 358,0 -0,40 0,4 2,79 1,00 2,01
Other importers 7249,8 491,9 -0,80 0,5 5,00 0,82 5
Spain 361,4 610,0 1,0 0,46
France 238,8 500,0 1,0 2,10
Portugal 17,2 1190,0 1,0 0,22
Greece 2,9 720,0 1,0 2,08
Cyprus 6,0 700,0 1,0 0,00
Ivory Coast 290,8 371,0 1,5 0,5 2,95 2,36 0,00
Cameroon 224,5 290,0 1,5 0,5 1,54 2,36 1,63
Dominican Republic 215,1 347,3 1,0 0,5 5,00 1,56 3,81
Belize and Suriname 115,5 373,5 1,0 0,5 3,20 1,98 2,46
Other ACP non LDC 89,4 450,0 1,0 0,5 3,28 2,06 1,06
Ecuador 5285,6 246,4 1,3 0,5 0,33 1,24 1,88
Colombia 1660,7 325,6 1,3 0,5 1,02 1,62 1,20
Costa Rica 2273,4 299,0 1,0 0,5 1,57 2,00 2,95
Panama 436,3 255,6 1,0 0,5 0,06 1,85 3,09
Honduras 514,9 270,0 1,5 0,5 0,27 2,06 1,96
Brazil 185,7 238,5 1,0 0,5 2,58 1,33 1,21
Guatemala 1518,6 211,4 1,5 0,5 2,76 2,46 1,24
Other MFN exporters non LDC 2578,9 195,2 1,0 0,5 3,30 1,57 3,77
LDC 82,6 204,5 1,5 0,5 5,00 2,75 1,70
Source: Comtrade, Faostat.
1:  For EU-15 and EU-10 apparent consumption (imports + domestic production - exports). 
2:  For France average production in 2005-2007, to smooth the effects of hurricane Dean (August 2007). No data available for Cameroon and Suriname as 
reporting exporters in Comtrade; Foastat data have been used instead.
3:  average (05-07/95-97) annual percent change in yields (negative rates have been set equal to zero) + 1/3 of the average (05-07/95-97) annual percent change in harvested area (negative rates have been set equal 
to zero). For country aggregates, weighted average with share of production in 2007 as weights. Resulting percent annual changes larger than 5 have been set equal to 5.Ancona - 122
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2017 base EPA only
   EPA  +        
Dec 2009 
Agreement
2017 base EPA only
   EPA  +        
Dec 2009 
Agreement
2017 base EPA only
   EPA  +        
Dec 2009 
Agreement
2017 base EPA only
   EPA  +        
Dec 2009 
Agreement
EU production (000 t) 626 574 574 572 574 574 572 574 574 572 574 574 572
EU consumption (000 t) 5.304 6.217 6.251 6.546 6.242 6.251 6.554 6.259 6.251 6.560 6.302 6.251 6.574
EU15 border price (euro) 616,1 602,7 596,0 538,6 598,0 596,1 537,0 594,6 596,1 535,9 586,3 596,1 533,1
EU imports (000 t) 4.678 5.643 5.677 5.974 5.667 5.677 5.982 5.685 5.677 5.988 5.728 5.677 6.002
EU imports from ACP (000 t) 855 889 2.302 1.954 875 2.276 1.928 865 2.260 1.911 844 2.222 1.873
EU imports from MFN (000 t) 3.823 3.604 2.304 4.020 4.792 2.327 4.054 4.819 2.342 4.077 4.884 2.375 4.129
EU imports from LDC (000 t) 0 1.150 1.071 0 0 1.074 0 0 1.076 0 0 1.080 0
USA imports (000 t) 3.544 4.269 4.314 4.283 4.266 4.314 4.282 4.265 4.314 4.282 4.263 4.315 4.281
ROW imports (000 t) 7.250 7.904 8.048 7.948 7.895 8.051 7.947 7.892 8.054 7.947 7.886 8.059 7.945
ACP total exports (000 t) 935 1.274 2.302 1.954 1.261 2.276 1.928 1.252 2.260 1.911 1.231 2.222 1.873
MFN total exports (000 t) 14.454 15.393 14.666 15.169 15.454 14.693 15.199 15.475 14.710 15.218 15.525 14.750 15.262
LDC total exports (000 t) 83 1.150 1.071 1.082 1.113 1.074 1.085 1.115 1.076 1.087 1.121 1.080 1.092
ACP export revenue (mill US$) 331,1 461,2 1.371,4 1.008,2 453,3 1.343,3 984,5 447,0 1.324,5 968,5 435,3 1.285,0 935,3
MFN export revenue (mill US$) 3.642,1 3.790,2 3.480,0 3.693,3 3.817,1 3.491,1 3.706,0 3.826,0 3.498,3 3.714,2 3.848,1 3.515,0 3.733,4
LDC export revenue (mill US$) 16,9 234,0 208,0 211,7 221,8 209,0 212,7 222,5 209,6 213,4 224,3 211,0 214,9
Traders' profits (mill US$) 0,0 0,0 0,0 265,2 304,2 298,0 432,7 497,2 487,0 822,3 948,9 928,4
Table 3 - Simulation results.
Perfect competition Mark-up 3% Mark-up 5% Mark-up 10%
2007 baseAncona - 122
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EU production (000 t) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,3 -0,3 -0,3 -0,3 -0,3 -0,3 -0,3 -0,3
EU consumption (000 t) 0,5 0,1 -0,1 -0,8 4,7 4,8 4,9 5,2 5,3 5,0 4,8 4,3
EU15 border price (euro) -1,1 -0,3 0,3 1,7 -9,6 -9,9 -10,1 -10,6 -10,6 -10,2 -9,9 -9,1
EU imports (000 t) 0,6 0,2 -0,1 -0,9 5,2 5,4 5,5 5,7 5,9 5,6 5,3 4,8
EU imports from ACP (000 t) 158,9 160,1 161,3 163,3 -15,1 -15,3 -15,4 -15,7 119,8 120,3 120,9 121,9
EU imports from MFN (000 t) -36,1 -51,4 -51,4 -51,4 74,5 74,2 74,1 73,9 11,5 -15,4 -15,4 -15,5
EU imports from LDC (000 t) -6,9 … … … -100,0 -100,0 -100,0 -100,0 -100,0 … … …
USA imports (000 t) 1,1 1,1 1,1 1,2 -0,7 -0,7 -0,7 -0,8 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,4
ROW imports (000 t) 1,8 2,0 2,1 2,2 -1,2 -1,3 -1,3 -1,4 0,6 0,7 0,7 0,7
ACP total exports (000 t) 80,7 80,5 80,5 80,5 -15,1 -15,3 -15,4 -15,7 53,4 52,9 52,6 52,2
MFN total exports (000 t) -4,7 -4,9 -4,9 -5,0 3,4 3,4 3,5 3,5 -1,5 -1,7 -1,7 -1,7
LDC total exports (000 t) -6,9 -3,5 -3,5 -3,7 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,1 -5,9 -2,5 -2,5 -2,6
ACP export revenue (mill US$) 197,4 196,3 196,3 195,2 -26,5 -26,7 -26,9 -27,2 118,6 117,2 116,7 114,9
MFN export revenue (mill US$) -8,2 -8,5 -8,6 -8,7 6,1 6,2 6,2 6,2 -2,6 -2,9 -2,9 -3,0
LDC export revenue (mill US$) -11,1 -5,8 -5,8 -5,9 1,8 1,8 1,8 1,8 -9,5 -4,1 -4,1 -4,2
Traders' profits (mill US$) 14,7 14,9 15,4 -2,0 -2,1 -2,2 12,4 12,5 12,9
Table 4 - Simulation results. Expected impact of policy changes under different market structures (% changes)
 'EPA only' vs. '2017 base'  'EPA + Dec 2009 Agreement' vs. 'EPA only'  'EPA + Dec 2009 Agreement' vs. '2017 base'
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Figure 2  Perfect competition. Calibrated model solution. Ancona - 122
nd EAAE Seminar 















Figure 3  Imperfect competition, mark-up. Observed market equilibrium  















Figure 4  Imperfect competition, mark-up. Calibrated model solution. Ancona - 122
nd EAAE Seminar 

















Figure 5  Imperfect competition, cartel. Observed market equilibrium  
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Figure 6  Imperfect competition, cartel. Observed market equilibrium and uncalibrated  















Figure 7  Imperfect competition, cartel. Calibrated model solution  
(the corrected per unit transaction cost calibrating the model is negative). 
 